Unethical or Illegal? Quirky Question # 146
Quirky Question # 146:
One of our employees recently complained about certain company practices that she contended were unethical. She did not contend the company engaged in illegal activity — just unethical conduct. We pointed out to her that we did not want someone working for the company if she truly believed we were engaging in unethical practices. Our anxiety about this situation was exacerbated when she told us she had reported the company’s practices to the press and a government agency. We fired her. She now contends that she was a whistleblower, protected by Minnesota’s Whistleblower statute. Should we be concerned?
Roy’s Analysis:
It is somewhat difficult for me to evaluate whether you should be concerned. As you related, your employee has reported the situation (whatever it might consist of) both to the press and a governmental agency. Thus, it would appear that your company is confronting three inter-related questions: a) how will the issue play out in the press; b) what will the governmental agency do with the information; and c) is your company facing any legal liability for terminating this employee. Although I will focus my comments primarily on the third issue, it seems to me that ultimately, the first two issues may be of greater importance to your firm.
You note that your employee has claimed she is protected by the Minnesota Whistleblower statute. Maybe. Maybe not.
As a prefatory matter, you should understand that Minnesota is somewhat unusual with respect to its Whistleblowing laws. Although we have a Whistleblower statute, Minn. Stat. § 181.932, Minnesota also has a common law equivalent. The common law claim was first recognized by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 1986, when the intermediate appellate court found for a plaintiff gas station employee who was fired for refusing to pump leaded gasoline into a car designed for unleaded gas. Phillips v. Clark Oil and Ref. Co., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. App. 1986). While that decision was being considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the legislature enacted the Whistleblower statute referenced above. Shortly thereafter, in 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s ruling in Phillips. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). Although there was some residual ambiguity about whether the statute preempted the parallel common law claim, subsequent decisions have demonstrated that the common law claim survived the enactment of the statute. In short, at least in Minnesota, your company needs to be sensitive about potential liability under both the statute and under the similar, though not identical, common law theory.
Based on the facts you have described briefly, there would appear to be at least two key issues bearing upon whether your company need be concerned about your former employee’s claims that she is a whistleblower. First, did she make a “report,” as that term has been defined under the statute? You noted that your employee “complained” but you have not really described the nature or content of her complaint. Therefore, I’ll simply flag this issue for you, emphasizing that courts have required an “official” or “formal” report, not merely an offhand remark to a co-worker or supervisor. These decisions seem designed to ensure that not every expression of discontent about some facet of the workplace can later be converted into a supposed “whistleblower” complaint in a post-hoc, post-termination analysis. You also noted in your question that, in addition to registering an internal complaint, your employee also communicated her concerns to an (unnamed) governmental agency. Again, depending on the nature, scope and content of her communication, this may suffice to constitute a “report” under the statute.
The second issue is whether your employee complained of illegal conduct. Based on your description, this portion of the analysis may present your most compelling defense. The Minnesota Whistleblower statute prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee because the employee made a good faith report of any violation, or suspected violation, of any federal or state law, or rule adopted pursuant to law.
Here, for better or worse, your company already has taken adverse action – you fired the employee. Further, you did so precisely because of the concerns she expressed about your company’s practices – the complaints she registered appear to have been the cause of her discharge.
Despite these facts, it would seem as though your company may be able to avoid any liability for this discharge because, at the time your employee expressed her concerns (however she may have articulated them), she did not believe that she was reporting on illegal conduct. As you stated in your question, your employee contended that certain company practices were unethical. An employee’s perception (and related report) that a company is acting “unethically” without the accompanying accusation that the conduct violates a federal or state statute or rule may not rise to the level of a protectible complaint under the Whistleblower statute.
For example, in a case decided by the Eighth Circuit approximately one year ago, Chial v. Sprint/United Management Company, No. 08-2012 (8th Cir. 2009), the federal appellate court considered a summer judgment grant by a trial judge in the District of Minnesota. The facts in Chial were relatively straightforward, relating to a commission compensation scheme adopted by one of defendant’s managers. Chial felt the practice was unethical and constituted “commissions fraud” on the employer, since the approach allowed employees to claim higher commissions than the amount to which they were entitled. Chial reported the practice to her supervisor and, after further investigation, the practice was barred by the company.
Chial’s efforts to report the practice were not rewarded, however. About a month after she first registered her objections to the approach, she was given a verbal warning relating to her performance. Two months later she received a written warning. After taking a stress-related leave and then returning to work, she was given a final warning. About seven months after raising the issue regarding the propriety of the commission scheme, a scheme the company later repudiated, Chial was terminated. Despite these facts, Chial’s claims were dismissed.
The trial and appellate courts both pointed out that the “statutorily protected conduct . . . is the good faith reporting of a violation or suspected violation of law.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, to constitute “whistleblowing,” the report must be made “for the purpose of exposing an illegality.” The Eighth Circuit emphasized that “for an employee to make a good faith report, she must subjectively believe the conduct is unlawful at the time she makes the report and she must make the report because the conduct is unlawful.” (Emphasis added.)
At her deposition, Chial testified that at the time she made the complaint, she did not believe that the practices about which she complained constituted a violation of either federal or state law. The appellate court observed, “Because she did not believe the practice was unlawful when she reported it, she could not have made the report for the purpose of exposing an illegality.”
The same deposition testimony doomed Chial’s common law Whistleblower claim as well. The appellate court found that Chial did not refuse to participate in the commission scheme on the basis of any good faith belief that the practice was “illegal.” Because she did not have that belief at the time she reported on the conduct, her common law claim was also deficient.
Although Chial’s candid deposition testimony proved fatal to her claims, your situation may be a bit more complicated. First, as you stated, your employee already has reported the situation to a governmental agency. While not conclusive evidence, this suggests that your employee felt the ethical transgressions at your company were of sufficient gravity to report them to a governmental agency. Perhaps this implicates an actual or suspected violation of law or rule; perhaps not. Depending on the nature of the underlying conduct, the nature of her report, and how her report is perceived by the agency, your employee may be better positioned than Chial to contend she was reporting on illegal behavior. Second, you also stated that your employee reported the situation to the press. Here, too, this suggests that your employee felt the public interest may be at stake, a concern absent in the Chial decision. Whether the public interest also involves legal ramifications cannot be discerned from the facts presented. (The “public interest” component also implicates a separate issue relating to Whistleblower law; concerns raised cannot be entirely personal to the complaining employee. I will address that topic in another Blog post.)
Two final observations. Although the unethical/illegal distinction has been addressed in Chial and other decisions (often with positive outcomes for employers), there are times when the distinction between these two concepts is quite blurry. Unethical conduct can easily rise to the level of illegal conduct, and the more egregious the behavior, the less likely courts are to require some magic “illegality” language to find a Whistleblower claim legitimate.
Finally, I would caution against the notion that discharge is appropriate because your company does not want to employ someone who considers your practices unethical, even if not illegal. Rather, I would encourage you to address your employee’s concerns, either by persuasively explaining why the practices are ethical, or if there is some moral ambiguity, possibly modifying the practices. If the practices complained of are entirely legit and your employee is simply misguided, then the issue I suggest you explore is whether, recognizing that your employee has a different perception, she nevertheless will be able to commit herself to meeting your performance expectations and the company’s business goals. If her objections to your company’s practices are so pronounced that she cannot make that commitment, then an end of the employment relationship may be the only alternative. But I would consider alternatives before leaping to that conclusion.
Leadership Series, Article # 2, Another Lesson from Kids
Earlier this month, I started a series of articles on the subject of leadership. The first article, written by Brian McDermott, was entitled, “Everything You Wanted to Know about Leadership . . . and Should Have Asked Your Kids.” (That article is still available on the Blog and can be found by using the “View By Topic” bar to the upper left and clicking on “Leadership,” or simply by scrolling down this Blog page to Brian’s May 5 article.) As Brian’s article suggests, you can find examples of leadership in many different contexts . . . if you simply pay attention.
I’ve spent a considerable portion of my non-work time coaching youth sports. Like Brian, I try to keep my eyes open to examples of leadership from those around me, young and old. Let me offer an illustration.
I have coached a lot of boys traveling baseball teams. These teams typically start when kids are 9 years old and continue until they are 15, when their high school sports careers begin. Practices almost always begin with stretching exercises, followed by a 3-5 minute jog around the baseball fields. On a team of 12 boys, the players are in different shape and of varying athletic ability, strength and stamina. Consequently, when they run, the kids often spread out, in bell curve fashion. The two or three fastest, strongest kids take the lead, about six kids are in the middle group, and two or three kids lag behind. As the run progresses, the last few kids get farther and farther behind the leaders. Read more
Roy’s Analysis of Quirky Question # 145, Marital Status Discrimination
You pose an interesting question., which is related to a number of questions I’ve previously addressed in this Blog. In past analyses, I’ve explored whether terminating a spouse or family member of someone pursuing a discrimination claim could expose a company to potential liability. (To access these articles, use the “View By Topic” bar on the upper left-hand side of this page, and scroll down to “Associational Discrimination.”) I also have analyzed whether the termination of a spouse or family member might constitute retaliation, either against the employee already pursuing a claim or against the spouse him- or herself. (See the articles under the “Retaliation” category.)
In your question, however, you have not suggested that the employee you first decided to terminate has brought any claims against the company at all. In this context, you inquire, would it constitute “marital status” discrimination for the company to end its employment relationship with the terminated employee’s spouse.
As you likely know, there is no federal law prohibiting marital status discrimination. Therefore, whether an employer may discharge someone because he or she is married to an employee being terminated is dependent on state law. Some state statutory schemes, including Minnesota’s, prohibit “marital status” discrimination. Historically, at least in Minnesota, courts limited the scope of this legal theory to contexts relating to the “status” of being married, i.e., an employer was precluded from basing a hiring or firing decision, or some other job action, on whether a person was single, married, separated or divorced.
A recent decision from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, has given the Minnesota prohibition on marital status discrimination a far broader interpretation. In Taylor v. LSI Corporation of America, No. A09-1410 (April 27, 2010), Minnesota’s intermediate appellate court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, rejected a narrow reading of the statutory proscription.
The Taylor facts were relatively straightforward. The appellant, LeAnn Taylor, began working at LSI in 1988. LSI was acquired in 1999 by Sagus International (Sagus). Shortly thereafter, Sagus appointed Gary Taylor as President of its LSI subsidiary. The following year, Gary Taylor started dating LeAnn, and the two were married in 2001. (The appellate court suggests that LeAnn Taylor may have received some undeserved beneficial treatment at the company once her relationship with Gary Taylor commenced, but these facts really have no bearing on the narrow question examined by the appellate court.)
In 2006, Sagus’ CEO became concerned about the performance of LSI, based in part on numerous complaints by the company’s customers and suppliers. These complaints led to a thorough assessment of LSI’s management and performance, followed by the terminations/resignations of six of LSI’s top 25 managers, including its President, Gary Taylor.
According to appellant, when the CEO accepted her husband’s resignation, he advised her husband with respect to her, “it would probably be uncomfortable or awkward for [your wife] to stay.” Appellant further alleged that in a direct conversation with her, the CEO stated that because her husband was leaving LSI, “he probably will be [relocating], which means you’ll be relocating as well. So we just decided to eliminate your position.” Sagus disputed these allegations, though the CEO conceded he did ask Gary Taylor whether his wife would welcome the opportunity to resign rather than be terminated in order to “save face.”
Appellant’s employment ended in August 2006 and she sued LSI soon thereafter based on the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) § 363A.08, subd. 2 (2006), the prohibition against marital status discrimination. The District Court granted LSI’s motion for summary judgment and LeAnn Taylor appealed.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the Minnesota legislature did not define “marital status” when it initially passed this statutory provision. After the statute was enacted, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had two opportunities to analyze and apply this statutory prohibition. In one case, the state’s high court broadly defined “marital status” and found that a company’s anti-nepotism policy violated the statute when the company precluded an employee from moving from part-time to full-time employment because she was married to another employee of the company. (Kraft, Inc. v. State by Wilson, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979)). A few years later, however, the court decided not to extend the definition of “marital status” to protect an employee from discrimination based on her spouse’s political views or associations. (Cybyske v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984)). The Cybyske court distinguishedKraft, stating, “the anti-nepotism policy in that case amounted to a refusal to hire a married couple, which was a ‘direct attack on the husband and wife as an entity and is contrary to the legislative judgment [that] reflects the protected status the institution of marriage enjoys in our society.’” (Quoting Kraft; citations omitted.)
Following the Cybyske decision, the Minnesota legislature amended the MHRA’s marital status provision for employment discrimination claims. Marital status was defined to “include[ ] protection against discrimination on the basis of identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse.” This 1988 version of the statute had not been challenged in any case that has reached the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Although the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized that courts in other jurisdictions had reached different conclusions on parallel factual patterns (citing to decisions from Alaska and Michigan), the court found that the statutory language in those states was not the same as the language of the MHRA. As the court observed, “By its clear terms, Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 24, prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on the identity or situation of the employee’s spouse. The crux of appellant’s claim is that LSI terminated her based on the identity and situation of her spouse, a co-employee whose forced resignation was occurring at the same time. This claim falls squarely within the statutory definition of “marital status.””(Emphasis added.) The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further development of the record.
As the Taylor case illustrates, in Minnesota at least, an employer faces potential liability if it terminates an employee solely because it also is terminating the employee’s spouse. If you act on your concern that it would best to discharge your employee merely because you consider it imprudent to “retain someone related to an embittered ex-employee,” you are exposing your company to a claim for marital status discrimination.
There is no need to assume that risk. In Taylor, for example, LSI apparently thought Gary Taylor might relocate and that this would mean the end of LeAnn’s employment as well. Rather than make assumptions, LSI should have let these events play out. If their prognostication was correct and Gary and LeAnn Taylor relocated, the problem would have been resolved. Similarly, if LeAnn had concluded that she did not want to work for the company that had terminated her husband, again the situation would have been resolved amicably and without litigation.
The Taylor decision adds another arrow to the employment plaintiff’s quiver. In addition to potential claims of associational discrimination and retaliation in contexts where the first-fired spouse already is asserting claims, an unsupported or ill-conceived discharge of the other member of the couple also may implicate claims under the MHRA’ prohibition of marital status discrimination. In short, you should move cautiously in this area.
Finally, for reasons I have previously discussed and won’t repeat at length here, there may be beneficial reasons to retain the non-fired spouse. First, he or she may be a terrific employee who would be hard to replace. Second, there may be strategic reasons for retaining the spouse of the discharged employee. If you would like to explore some of those reasons, see, Quirky Question # 62, accessible under the “Retaliation” category above.
Marital Status Discrimination, Quirky Question # 145
I know you’ve written about the issue of terminating family members in other Blog posts. And I know you recently discussed the nuances of terminating a family member in a closely held company. We have a more vanilla issue.
Can we terminate a spouse of another employee we are terminating? We just don’t think it would be a good idea to retain someone related to an embittered ex-employee. Does this plan implicate anything relating to marital status? (We are not terminating this individual because of her status as “married.”) Your guidance would be appreciated.




