“Cat’s Paw Theory Endorsed by U.S. Supreme Court — Staub v. Proctor Hospital
[Readers: The following analysis of last month's Supreme Court decision in its "Cat's Paw" case was written by my colleague, Ben Weeks. If you have any questions about the case, don't hesitate to contact Ben at weeks.benjamin@dorsey.com, or at 612.492.6157. Additional information regarding Ben is available at: http://www.dorsey.com/people/detail.aspx?Attorney=4985&mode=full. We hope you find this analysis helpful. Regards, Roy]
On March 1, 2011, the Supreme Court decided the case of Staub v. Proctor Hospital, No. 09-400. The decision was unanimous (8-0), with Justice Scalia writing the Court’s opinion, Justice Alito writing a concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Kagan taking no part in the case. The Court overturned the Seventh Circuit, holding that a reasonable jury could have determined that Proctor Hospital violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), on a “cat’s paw” theory, when Proctor’s human resources director terminated Vincent Staub based in part on recommendations of Staub’s supervisors who allegedly were motivated by hostility towards Staub’s responsibilities as a member of the Army Reserves.
(For those unfamiliar with the “cat’s paw” concept, Justice Scalia explained: “The term “cat’s paw” derives from a fable conceived by Aesop, put into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United States employment discrimination law by Posner in 1990. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7). In the fable, a monkey induces a cat by flattery to extract roasting chestnuts from the fire. After the cat has done so, burning its paws in the process, the monkey makes off with the chestnuts and leaves the cat with nothing. A coda to the fable (relevant only marginally, if at all, to employment law) observes that the cat is similar to princes who, flattered by the king, perform services on the king’s behalf and receive no reward.”)
Background Facts
Staub, a member of the United States Army Reserve, worked at Proctor Hospital as an angiography technician. Staub’s immediate supervisor, Janice Mulalley, and her supervisor, Michael Korenchuk, disliked Staub’s Reserve obligations, which included training one weekend per month plus two to three weeks each year, because the obligations made scheduling difficult. Both Mulally and Korenchuk made disparaging remarks regarding Staub’s Reserve service, and Mulally indicated to a co-worker that she wanted to “get rid of” Staub. Korenchuk was aware that Mulally was “out to get” Staub. Read more
Roy’s Analysis of Quirky Question # 170, Unconventional Medical Care and FMLA Coverage
Quirky Question # 170:
We have a diverse workforce. While most of our employees utilize Western-style medicine for their medical needs, that is not uniformly true. Some employees rely upon non-traditional (at least not US traditions) medical treatment.
How far does the FMLA go with respect to these types of treatments? Recently, one of our employees sought FMLA coverage for faith-healing treatments. Although the employee’s belief that faith-healing might be genuine, do we have to cover it? Please, say it ain’t so.
Roy’s Analysis:
Good questions, but not necessarily susceptible to a simple answer. Let’s start with the basics. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) has certain qualifying criteria. In essence, an employee must have worked 1250 hours in the preceding 12 months and have been employed by the company for at least 12 months. If an employee meets these criteria, he or she may qualify for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave. (There are some “quirks” that I have addressed in other Blog posts I’ve written on the FMLA, including for example, the fact that the 12 months of employment do not have to be consecutive and can, in fact, be separated by years. For a review of those articles, use the category index above.)
The FMLA encompasses medical care needed by the employee him/herself as well as medical care needed by certain family members. Leave may be taken intermittently when medically necessary. Read more
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain: Supreme Court Rules on Oral FLSA Employee Complaints
[Readers: The U.S. Supreme Court has decided several important employment law cases during March. Set forth below is an analysis of the Saint-Gobain decision, written by my colleague, Ben Weeks. If you have any questions regarding this analysis, please don't hesitate to contact Ben or me. Ben's direct line is 612.492.6157 and his email is weeks.benjamin@dorsey.com. Additional information regarding Ben is available at: http://www.dorsey.com/benjamin-weeks/. I hope you find this analysis helpful.
Next week, we will publish an article about the "Cat's Paw" decision, also rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this month. Regards, Roy]
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain: Supreme Court Rules That Oral Employee Complaints Are Afforded FLSA Retaliation Protection
By: Ben Weeks
Introduction
On March 22, 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., __U.S.__, No. 09-834 (Mar. 22, 2011), holding that oral complaints are sufficient to support retaliation cases under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
The Court’s decision has potentially significant implications beyond the FLSA, as several other federal statutes—including the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, and the Clean Air Act—include similar language in their anti-retaliation provisions. Of particular importance to employers, the holding reaffirms a best practice for employee complaints: Pay attention to all employee complaints, regardless whether they are oral or written.
Background
Kasten, a former employee in Saint-Gobain’s Portage, Wisconsin facility, received repeated warnings, and ultimately was terminated, for violating company policy requiring hourly employees to clock in and out of work. See Kasten v. St. Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2009). Following his termination, Kasten filed a lawsuit alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for making oral complaints to his supervisors and human resources personnel that the location of the company’s time clocks prevented employees from recording their time spent “donning and doffing” protective gear. See id. at 835-36. Read more
Employees’ Informational Privacy Rights — Supreme Court Decides NASA v. Nelson
[Readers: The Supreme Court decided two employment cases in the last two weeks. I already have analyzed the Thompson decision (see the discussion below QQ # 169). Set forth below is an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in NASA v. Nelson that was prepared by my colleague, Jillian Kornblatt. If you have any questions about this decision, do not hesitate to reach out to Jillian at 612.492.6156 or kornblatt.jillian@dorsey.com. Additional information regarding Jillian is available at http://www.dorsey.com/jillian-kornblatt/.
We are publishing Jillian's analysis in lieu of my response to QQ # 168. Tune in next Monday for that article. This week we also will have an analysis of our West Coast Quirky Question (# 169), and an article about the United Kingdom's anti-bribery statute. Finally, after a surprising delay, we do have a winner to the current Trivia Game. The answer, and a new question, will be posted Thursday. Regards, Roy]
Employees’ Informational Privacy Rights — Supreme Court Decides NASA v. Nelson
By: Jillian Kornblatt
On January 19, 2011, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530. The Court unanimously (a six justice majority, two concurring opinions, and Justice Kagan recusing herself), held that it did not violate the Constitution for employees of a government contractor to be required to submit to background checks in order to retain their jobs. The Court stated that the reasonableness of the government’s inquiries and the privacy protections in place meant that the background checks did not violate a “constitutional right to informational privacy.” The practical implications of this decision are discussed in the last section of this article. Read more
Associational Discrimination: Supreme Court Decides Thompson v. North American Stainless
On January 24, 2011, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, No. 09-291. The Court unanimously (8-0, with Justice Kagan recusing herself) reversed the 10-6 en banc decision from the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision reached a Charging Party’s fiancé. The decision’s significant practical ramifications are discussed at the conclusion of this article.
Background Facts
The facts of this case are straightforward. The defendant company, North American Stainless (NAS) terminated one of its employees, Miriam Regalado. She filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that she had been discharged on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Three weeks after Regalado filed her Charge, NAS also terminated her fiancé, Eric Thompson. Thompson then independently filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that he was a victim of retaliatory conduct by NAS.
Procedural Posture
The District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted NAS summary judgment, concluding that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” The Sixth Circuit initially reversed this determination, but following a rehearing by the entire intermediate appellate court, the en banc court flipped the panel’s determination and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the case. The Sixth Circuit concluded that because Thompson did not “engag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,” he “is not included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action.” (I previously analyzed the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in an earlier Blog posting; see Quirky Question # 99, Retaliation Against Fiancé.)
The Supreme Court granted review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision. For the purposes of the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Court assumed that NAS had fired Thompson to retaliate against Regalado for filing her Charge of Discrimination. The Supreme Court evaluated two related questions: did NAS’s firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation; and, if it did, does Title VII provide Thompson a cause of action? Read more
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